Detroit Project Safe Neighborhoods: FINAL EVALUATION REPORT

MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY | School of Criminal Justice

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Michigan Justice Statistics Center

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Executive Summary

Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN) is a national program that seeks to reduce levels of gun and gang crime, and violent crime generally. The Eastern District of Michigan has participated in PSN since its outset in 2001. Although the Eastern District has included attention to violent crime in multiple communities, Detroit has been a primary target area throughout the years of PSN.

PSN is a grant supported program by the Bureau of Justice Assistance, U.S. Department of Justice. This report summarizes the implementation and impact of the grant supported program that was funded in fiscal year 2018. During this period, the PSN team focused on Detroit Police Department's 9th precinct, with targeted enforcement in specific hotspot areas.

PSN Detroit relied upon a multi-agency team and followed a comprehensive strategy of targeted enforcement, intervention with at-risk individuals, and youth-focused prevention. The PSN initiative, like law enforcement operations nationally, was significantly affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. This added to the complexity of the evaluation and makes some of our research findings tentative.

With this qualification in mind, we find support for the positive impact of PSN. Specifically, following the implementation of PSN in the 9th precinct until the shutdowns associated with the impact of the pandemic in March 2020, the 9th precinct witnessed a decline from 13.6 shooting victimizations per month to 11.9 per month (-12.5%). During this same period, Detroit's other precincts witnessed a total increase from 63.8 to 72.6 (+13.7%), or an average per precinct increase from 6.3 to 7.3 per month. When examining the specific hotspot areas, we observed a decline of 2.6 shooting victimizations per month in the hotspot zone when compared to a comparison area drawn from parts of the city that did not experience PSN.

These trends were interrupted by the onset of the pandemic, as well as the period of social unrest and protest following the death of George Floyd in Minneapolis. The pandemic had a serious effect in

Detroit with the Police Department experiencing significant personnel losses due to illness and quarantine, and the suspension of court operations. As was the case nationally, violent crime increased in Detroit and in the 9th precinct in 2020 and the first half of 2021. In the last quarter of 2021 and the first quarter of 2022, the 9th precinct again witnessed welcome declines in shooting victimizations. These declines were also observed citywide and were particularly noteworthy in the specific PSN target areas within the 9th precinct.

The PSN team's strategy of supporting a focused multi-agency enforcement team, while leveraging comprehensive intervention and place-based strategies appears to have enhanced public safety in Detroit.

Project Safe Neighborhoods - Detroit

Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN) supports data-driven efforts to reduce levels of gun and gang violence. The PSN model relies on a multi-agency team working with a research partner (RP) to engage in a strategic problem-solving approach to violence prevention (BJA, 2021; Klofas, Hipple, & McGarrell, 2010). The PSN multi-agency team, coordinated by the U.S. Attorney's Office in the Eastern District of Michigan, went through a strategic planning phase based on problem solving principles, developed a strategic plan, and implemented the strategy with the goal of reducing violent crime in the PSN target areas. The strategy was comprehensive and included prevention, intervention, and targeted enforcement, along with community engagement and collaboration.

This report presents the findings from an evaluation conducted by a team of research partners from the School of Criminal Justice at Michigan State University. The research partners have been active in Detroit for a number of years working with the Detroit Police Department, U.S. Attorney's Office (USAO), Wayne County Prosecutor's Office (WCPO), Michigan Department of Correction (MDOC), Michigan State Police (MSP), federal law enforcement and particularly the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF), as well as social service and outreach workers, faith-based partners, the schools, and other community partners.[2] In developing these strategies, PSN leveraged numerous crime and violence prevention strategies active in Detroit and in the PSN target areas specifically. The basic model was one where PSN supported targeted enforcement (law enforcement, prosecution, and community corrections) to complement the prevention, intervention, enforcement, and community building strategies employed by the Detroit Police Department (DPD) and its many partners.

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[2] A full list of partners and their engagement in planning and implementation can be found in Appendix A.

Problem Analysis

PSN Detroit was initiated with a strategic planning process that included an analysis of violent crime patterns. The problem analysis indicated that within Detroit, violent crime involved the use of firearms and was geographically concentrated. According to DPD Crime Intelligence, in 2017, 82% of all homicides in Detroit were committed with firearms. For every one homicide committed with a firearm, there were approximately three to three and a half non-fatal shootings. Thus, serious gun-related violence was the focus of Detroit PSN. This gun violence was geographically concentrated at both the precinct levels and in micro-places within precincts. Based on these analyses, the PSN focus area was determined to be Detroit's 9th precinct and hotspots within the 9th precinct. Despite progress in reducing fatal and non-fatal shootings over the last few years, the 9th precinct continued to have the highest levels in the city. For example, in 2017 the 9th precinct had 175 fatal and non-fatal shootings. The next highest precinct had 128 such incidents. For the first 10 months of 2018, the 9th precinct had 156 fatal and non-fatal shootings whereas all other precincts were below 100. Thus, the 9th precinct served as the PSN target area.

Within the 9th precinct, fatal and non-fatal shootings were concentrated within police scout car areas (SCA) and even at the street segment level. The Crime Intelligence Unit and the RPs used a variety of geospatial techniques to identify three to four hot spot areas that served as specific target areas within the 9th precinct.

In addition to the crime analytical techniques, PSN strategic planning as well as implementation was informed by street level intelligence. Each week every gun-related incident was reviewed during a systematic incident review process involving DPD officers and investigators supported by federal law enforcement, prosecutors, and probation and parole agents. The incident reviews were complemented by daily screening of gun-involved arrests (DPD and ATF) as well as a Gunstat process that formally scored

gun-involved arrestees using risk criteria adopted and modified from other PSN programs such as Atlanta and Tampa.

As will be discussed in the next section, the combination of the crime analysis assessments, the RP's analyses, and street level intelligence suggested that the key drivers of fatal and non-fatal shootings, and related violent crimes of robberies and aggravated assaults, included:

- Chronic violent offenders illegally possessing and using firearms

- Gangs and violent street groups

- Operating in hot spots and repeat violent crime locations

Additionally, the PSN team believed that low clearance rates, particularly with respect to non-fatal shootings, mitigate the deterrent message of the PSN and Ceasefire strategies.

Results of the Problem Analysis – Key Drivers of Violence Problem?
1. Target Area

The goal of the PSN project was to reduce gun crime and gang violence within the 9th Precinct. Within the 9th Precinct five areas of concern were identified based on hot spot analyses, henceforth referred to as Cluster 1. As seen in Table 1, this area was chosen as the PSN target area due to its high incidences of homicide and non-fatal shootings. With an estimated population of 38,416, Cluster 1 is located on the East Side of Detroit in the Northeast corner of the 9th Precinct. While violent crimes may occur across the city, a particularly high rate of these offenses was concentrated within Cluster 1 warranting greater attention. From January 1, 2017, to November 19, 2018, Cluster 1 had a total of 35 homicides and 146 non-fatal shootings.[3] From January 1, 2018 to November 19, 2018 alone, there were 15 homicides and 69 non-fatal shootings in the area.

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[3] Sources: DPD preliminary offense data from 1/1/2017 to 6/12/2018, US Census Bureau 2016 ACS 5-year population estimates. Crime rates are per 100,000 persons and are calculated using 2016 population estimates. 2018 rates are based on current year-to-date (YTD) numbers. Offense counts are based on a charge level of granularity: if a report contains more than one violent offense charge, each of the charges is included in the count.

Table 1. Frequency of Violent Crime within Cluster 1

Est. Pop	SCAs	Hom. Total	NFS Total	2018 Hom. (YTD)	2018 Hom. Rate	2018 NFS (YTD)	2018 NFS Rate	2017 Hom. Total	2017 Hom. Rate	2017 NFS Total	2017 NFS Rate
38,416	9-1, 9-2, 9-5, 9-6, 9-7	35	146	15	39.04	69	179.61	20	52.06	77	200.43

Note: Est. Pop = estimated population; SCAs = scout car areas; Hom. = homicide; YTD = year to date; NFS = non-fatal shooting

IMPLEMENTATION PLAN
1. *Goal Identification*

The Detroit PSN Task Force sought to significantly reduce violent crime, particularly fatal and non-fatal shootings, in the PSN target areas (9th precinct and hotspot target areas within the precinct). The PSN Task Force, supported by DPD's Crime Intelligence Unit, DPD's Crime Gun Intelligence Center (CGIC), precinct analysts, and the RP, monitored violent crime trends on a real-time basis and adjusted strategies as necessary to achieve this goal.

2. *Targeted and prioritized people-, place-, or combined enforcement strategies to address these violent crime drivers?*

The PSN Task Force employed a comprehensive and coordinated set of targeted and prioritized enforcement strategies (see Appendix D). These included people-, group-, place-based strategies as well as combined people- and place-based strategies. To address the issue of chronic violent offenders and felons-in-possession, daily screening of gun-crime arrestees was complemented by a Gunstat screening process that involved a risk assessment to prioritize the highest risk arrestees (for both offending and victimization). [4] A joint USAO-WCPO prosecution screening team, supported by DPD and ATF, screened these cases to determine the most appropriate prosecution venue. These processes, as well as street level intelligence, also supported proactive investigations by the PSN task force, 9th precinct shooting response

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[4] See Oliphant et al., 2020.

teams, and other federal task forces. The Detroit CGIC, employing National Integrated Ballistic Information Network (NIBIN) technology, also provided intelligence and investigative leads to target enforcement action at the individuals actively involved in shootings.

The gang and group component of violence was addressed by Detroit Ceasefire.[5] Built upon the evidence-based focused deterrence strategy,[6] Ceasefire identified high-risk (for gun violence) groups, monitored violent crime (to determine "group member shooting incidents"), and proactively and reactively addressed violence through call-ins, custom notifications, outreach, and services. Ceasefire enforcement activities were conducted by the PSN task force as well as a Ceasefire disruption team in the 9th precinct, and the Gang Intelligence Unit. These enforcement teams, and their leaders, had already been working in a coordinated fashion in Ceasefire as well as in an earlier PSN initiative that focused on the 8th precinct. Working together with Ceasefire were federal-local task forces that engage in longer term gang investigations and prosecutions as well as ongoing probationer and parolee monitoring. This monitoring was facilitated by the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) embedded agent program whereby probation and parole agents were embedded within DPD and the PSN task force to work in a coordinated fashion.

The place-based strategies included Project Green Light Detroit (PGLD)[7] as well as specific problem-solving strategies aimed at specific locations. PGLD was a partnership between DPD and small business owners that involved the installation of high-quality surveillance cameras that were monitored by the RTCC. Participation involved signage as well as other compliance standards and DPD committed to prioritizing calls for service from Green Light locations as well as follow-up with the businesses when incidents occurred. Additionally, 9th precinct leadership and Neighborhood Police Officers (NPOs)

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[5] See Circo et al., 2020b, 2021.
[6] See Braga, Weisburd & Turchan, 2018
[7] Circo et al., 2020a.

responded to repeat violent crime locations through a variety of actions including code enforcement, nuisance abatement, surveillance, directed patrol, and targeted enforcement. During PSN implementation, DPD also used targeted and integrated technology at key street corridors. Similar in principle, this technology extended PGLD to corridors and included license plate readers, surveillance cameras and similar technology.

The 9th precinct and the PSN task force also relied on crime analysis and street level intelligence to continually focus the combined people- and place-based enforcement. Specifically, on a regular basis hot spot maps were created based on shootings. Additional timely intelligence was developed about potentially "hot people" active in the hotspots (e.g., warrants, high-risk probationers and parolees, suspected trigger pullers, etc.). The 9th precinct and PSN task force included local-state-federal enforcement partners, probation and parole agents, and often enlisted other enforcement units, allowing for highly coordinated and targeted enforcement operations in these hot zones. This occurred within the identified hotspot zones and included other hot spots that emerged in the 9th precinct.

ATF, working with DPD and the PSN task force, and supported by the CGIC and its NIBIN and crime gun tracing technologies conducted ongoing investigations of firearms traffickers. These investigations were prioritized as part of the overall PSN strategy.

Additionally, PSN leveraged a related BJA-supported initiative operating in the 9th precinct. Through the Strategies for Policing Innovation program, DPD and WCPO tested an innovative one-person grand jury intended to increase victim cooperation in shooting incidents.[8] The program was based on a pilot project conducted in the 10th precinct that demonstrated increased clearance and closure rates and a decline in non-fatal shootings. There was overlapping leadership of both the special grand jury initiative

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[8] See Magee et al. 2021

and PSN. The goal was to increase clearance and closures in non-fatal shootings, to incapacitate chronic violent offenders and reinforce the deterrence message, and reduce gun violence.

Finally, these multiple strategies were complemented by DPD's Community Compstat. Community Compstat followed the Compstat model of timely and accurate information and intelligence to inform effective tactics, deploy resources, and monitor progress. As the name implies, however, there was a strong community component. The monthly meetings occurred at the precinct level and included community participation. This effort promoted information sharing, police-community relationships, and the creation of well-informed strategies to reduce crime.

3. Prevention Strategies to Complement Enforcement

A variety of prevention strategies (see Appendix E) were deployed to complement prioritized enforcement strategies. The Ceasefire model itself complemented its enforcement strategies with prevention. This was accomplished through an Outreach team that provided case management services to high-risk individuals involved in high-risk gangs and violent street groups. The Outreach workers provided mentorship and referred clients to a variety of services. The Outreach workers were supported by a dedicated social worker for referrals as needed. Similar support was provided by MDOC agents providing risk and needs based services to probationers and parolees. These included re-entry services.

In addition, a variety of youth prevention services were provided by the Detroit Youth Violence Prevention Initiative (DYVPI). The DYVPI collaborated closely with schools and other stakeholders to establish over 34 Safe Routes to Schools with students using Geographic Information System (GIS) to create maps used by community volunteers and law enforcement. DYVPI Success Centers provided youth with in-school alternatives to suspensions.

DYVPI also provided a summer youth employment strategy, and a Children in Trauma Intervention Camp (CITI Camp) that provided year-round services. The "Brotherhood: No Boundaries" program was a

school and community-based effort in the 9th precinct aimed at reducing violence and school code violations, improving school retention and youth employment, and improving relationships between youth and law enforcement. This included weekly discussion sessions for young males held every Thursday after school, hosted by DPD officers, the Ceasefire Outreach Team, and a staff member from the Department of Neighborhoods. The Brotherhood included an annual youth summit for approximately 300 students for continued engagement, mentorship, motivation, and exposure to opportunities. The Brotherhood partnered with various agencies to provide youth with summer employment, service learning, and leadership opportunities to continue engagement during summer months.

Additional prevention strategies focused on developing positive interactions with law enforcement by exposing youth to vast career paths within the justice system. The USAO provided presentations and training on programs such as Project Sentry, Justice League Academy (JLA), and the School Safety Initiative. Project Sentry is an evidence-informed initiative built on PSN strategies and designed to educate youth on the dangers and consequences of gun violence and gang affiliation. The presentations and curriculum were delivered by law enforcement, medical professionals, social services professionals, educators, community representatives, and peers.

Detroit Ceasefire also included strong community partnerships led primarily by members of the faith community. This partnership provided an opportunity for a community voice in call-in meetings, an outreach resource for referrals, a visible community voice through community marches (Peace Walks) following violent incidents, and a mechanism for police-community dialogue. The faith-based community partners coordinated with the outreach workers to support victims by addressing safety concerns and related needs.

Table 2 illustrates the number of people who engaged with the Outreach Team from 2018-2021. This differentiates between participants based on referral source (i.e., call-in or other referral). From 2018-

2021, there have been a total of 285 people who have requested a service through the Outreach Team[9].
Call-in meetings (including custom notifications) account for approximately 38% of the referrals for
service. As of May 2022, 159 people are considered to be active participants.

Table 2. Frequency of Active and Inactive Persons Enrolled in Services by Referral Source 2018-2021

	2018	**2019**	**2020**	**2021**	**Total**
Call-in	24	42	21	21	108
Referral	64	40	45	28	177
Total	88	82	66	49	285

Source: Smartsheet: CF Member Roster
Note: Referral includes self-referral, referral by outreach worker, referral by law enforcement officer,
faith-based referral, and peer victim. Call-in includes referrals from a call-in meeting or custom
notifications

A broad range of services are offered, such as employment readiness through Detroit @ Work,
education courses, legal assistance, housing, mental health/substance use counseling, and other basic needs
support. From 2019-2021, the most frequently utilized service was assistance with an ID or driver's license,
followed by employment services and legal assistance.

Finally, a section of the target area received funding from Michigan State Housing Development
Authority (MHSDA) to complete demolitions of specific structures. This aided in the demolition of vacant,
publicly owned homes/buildings which met specific blight criteria including, being deemed a public
nuisance, identified as dangerous to public safety, or have had critical internal systems disconnected or
rendered ineffective.

Additional outreach strategies that were leveraged and implemented throughout this initiative are
included in Appendix E.

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[9] Outreach operations were severely impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 and 201. Many activities were suspended
or limited due to restrictions on in-person interaction.

PROCESS EVALUATION

The process evaluation involved assessment of the implementation of the above-described strategies. Due to the comprehensive set of strategies, it was not feasible to track all the enforcement, intervention, prevention, and community engagement strategies. The research team monitored these activities during bi-weekly Ceasefire meetings that focused on the city of Detroit. Data collection focused on the PSN task force, call-in meetings, and services provided through Ceasefire outreach workers and the social service providers.

As noted in the introduction, the COVID-19 pandemic had a significant impact on implementation of the strategies. This is reflected in the timeline as well as in the enforcement data and call-in meeting schedule. At the outset of the pandemic in spring 2020, the DPD workforce, and the 9th precinct specifically were affected by staff shortages due to illness and quarantine.

Table 3 summarizes the targeted enforcement activities of PSN. The PSN enforcement team conducted its first targeted operation in March 2019. This was the first of six operations through March 2020. The impact of the pandemic is then evident as these operations were suspended until September 2020. It should be noted that precinct enforcement actions continued as shooting response and disruption enforcement teams prioritized responses to shootings.

Table 3. PSN Firearms Investigative Team Operations, March 2019 to September 2021

Activities:	March '19	May '19	June '19	Aug '19	Sept '19	March '20	Sept '20	Dec '20	Apr '21	Aug '21	Sept '21
Arrests											
Firearms Related		4			3	1	4	3	12	15	1
Narcotics Related	8	10	3	2	5		3	1	4	8	7
Firearms/Narcotics Related	1								1		1
Other: Felony	4	4	5	1	4	4	4	4		12	14
Other: Parole Violation (Home Check)			3		3				1		
Other: Felony Probation Violation					4	1		1		2	1
Other	12	1			1 Homicide		5	1		3 JUV	
Other: Misdemeanor Narcotics	11	1	7		2		19	10	4	2	6
Other: Misdemeanor Arrest	2	16		8	5	1	3	12	11	4	13
Other: Misdemeanor Warrant		1						1		1	
MDOC											
Parolee/Probation Home Checks	34	50	48	56	50	38	51	57	50	58	19
Violations Discovered			3		2	1	3		1		
Traffic Enforcement											
Civil Infraction	140	279	12		41	250	548	779	392	455	842
Misdemeanor Infraction	28	16	12		20	23	3	23	1	4	5
Surveillance											
Surveillance Operations	2				10			3	11	8	
Surveillance Assists									3		
Persons Investigated											
Interviews Conducted	1	2	1		12			8	10	6	19
Investigated & Released Male	60	145	48	5	140	118	160	240	148	215	307
Investigated & Released Female	26	92	12	10	45	10	78	124	71	119	192
Investigative Other											
UC/CI Operations		7						2	2		
SOR Compliance Checks		30		107				23			
SOR Violations		43		36				1			
Warrants											

Search Warrants Served	14	9	6	7	3	5	6	3	4	7	5
Search Warrants Obtained			1		3		2	2	4	2	2
Arrest Warrants Obtained				1							
Arrest Warrants Executed								3	2		
Street Enforcement	1			3	1		2	2	2		6
Weapons Confiscated/Purchased											
Handguns	4	4	3	1	3	3	6	3	8	20	3
Long Guns	1		1	1		2			2	2	
Narcotics Confiscated/Purchased											
Grams Of Fentanyl	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	16	16.3
Grams Of Meth	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	11	0.5
Grams Cocaine	81.9	36.8	48.9	5.3	0.5	1	76	7.6	53.3	0.4	7.1
Grams Heroin	21.9	3.5	10.8	2.5	77.75	4	57.9	11.5	35	21.2	
Grams Marijuana	192	60		1,183			10	86	4,150	4,045	
# Pills							51.7	8	9		
Street Value Of Narcotics	$74,099	$18,580	$52,880	$8,447	$103		$8,520	$24,600	$122,770	$60,990	$32,070
Forfeiture											
Money Seized For Forfeiture	$3,544.00	$3,013.00	$2,246	$2,841	$1,013	$152.00	$1,504	$1,319	$2,989.00	$5,195	$109.00
Vehicles Seized For Forfeiture	18	2	1	1							4
Vehicles											
Impounded	8	28	7	1	8	5	29	40	14	31	22
Investigated	64	144	20		80	43	229	301	171	245	381

The primary intervention strategy was based on the focused deterrence model utilizing call-in meetings as well as custom notifications. As Table 4 indicates, call-in meetings were also significantly affected by the pandemic. Call-in meetings were originally implemented in Detroit in 2013. These increased in frequency reaching a peak in 2016 with six meetings. They moved to a quarterly basis from 2017-2019. This schedule was anticipated in 2020 until the pandemic struck and in-person meetings were suspended, with call-ins only resuming in November 2021. The Ceasefire team, which includes law enforcement, outreach workers, and community partners, attempted to continue to deliver the focused deterrence strategy through custom notifications that involved meetings with specific individuals considered to be at risk of being involved in shootings (i.e., custom notifications).

Table 4. Detroit Ceasefire Call-in Meetings, 2013-2021

	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
# of meetings	2	3	3	6	4	4	4	1	1
	8/29	5/20	3/15	1/26	1/19	3/20	3/12	2/18	11/30
	12/12	8/28	8/27	5/18	3/14	6/21	5/01		
		12/4	11/14	6/16	7/19	9/05	8/26		
				8/25	12/7	12/11	11/17		
				9/29					
				12/1					

Impact on Shootings

The outcome evaluation focused on the impact of PSN on shooting victimizations, specifically fatal and nonfatal shootings. As noted above, this was complicated by the impact of the pandemic. We treated the year 2018 and the first two months of 2019 as the pre-intervention period. March 2019 was treated as the PSN intervention date based on the implementation of the PSN enforcement team operations in the target area and the first call-in meeting since the PSN award was active.

Table 5 presents the trends in the outcome measure, the number of fatal and nonfatal shootings. The first comparison is the trend in the PSN 9th precinct compared to all other precincts. Here we see that the 9th precinct averaged 13.6 shooting victimizations per month in the pre-PSN period. This declined to 11.9 per month following the implementation of PSN (Program Period #1). During this same period, shooting victimizations in other precincts increased from a total of 62.8 per month to 72.6 per month. When averaged across the other precincts, this reflected an increase from 6.3 to 7.3 per month. These data suggest that PSN reduced shooting victimizations in the 9th precinct at a time that the rest of the city experienced an increase.

The impact of the pandemic and the summer of unrest is reflected in Program Period #2 that began in March of 2020. Shooting victimizations increased significantly in both the 9th precinct and citywide. Shooting victimizations moderated in Program Period #3 in both the 9th precinct and citywide. It was during this period that enforcement operations resumed, a call-in was held, custom notifications were increasingly used, and court operations resumed, though with a significant backlog.

The second comparison contrasts the trend in the specific Scout Car Areas in the 9th precinct that were target enforcement areas for PSN, and what are labeled as synthetic controls. The synthetic controls were drawn from the 2nd, 3rd, and 10th precincts. These were precincts that had not been involved in PSN and were the last precincts to participate in the Ceasefire focused deterrence strategy.[10] The synthetic controls provide a "counter-factual" to the trends in the 9th precinct Scout Car Areas (SCAs).

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[10] Detroit utilized a "rolling implementation" of the Ceasefire focused deterrence strategy. It was initially implemented in the 5th and 9th precincts and has included other precincts over time based on the availability of resources. Consequently, the 2nd, 3rd, and 10th precincts are the most distinct from the 9th precinct in terms of the violence reduction strategies.

The result of this analysis is consistent with the analysis at the full precinct level. Shooting victimizations in the 9th precinct PSN target SCAs, declined from 6.4 per month prior to PSN, to 4.3 per month during the initial program period (prior to the pandemic). During this same period, shooting victimizations increased from 6.4 per month to 6.9 per month in the synthetic control areas.

We did not extend the comparisons beyond March 2020 because the analysis indicated that the synthetic controls diverged in the "fit" between the treatment and comparisons and thus we could not be confident that the controls reflected an adequate comparison area. The RPs plan to refine the analysis in the future.

Table 5. Shooting Victimizations in PSN Areas and Comparisons (1/2018-3/2022)

	Pre-PSN (1/18-2/19)		Program Period #1 (3/19-2/20)		Program Period #2 (3/20-2/21)		Program Period #3 (3/21-3/22)	
	Total	Monthly	Total	Monthly	Total	Monthly	Total	Monthly
PSN Precinct #9	190	13.6	143	11.9	246	20.5	228	17.54
All other precincts	879	62.8	871	72.6	1268	105.7	1158	89.1
Average in other precincts	87.9	6.3	87.1	7.3	126.8	10.6	115.8	8.91
PSN SCAs	90	6.4	52	4.3	130	10.8	108	8.3
Synthetic control	90	6.4	83.2	6.9				

The final analysis examined the trend during the last two quarters of the project (10/1/2021-3/31/2022). This period reflected somewhat of a return to "normal" operations with more opportunities for face-to-face interactions allowing custom notifications and prevention activities, a call-in meeting, and court activities. As Table 6 indicates, Detroit experienced welcome declines in shooting victimizations during the last two quarters of the project period. This was true in the 9th precinct (-22.8%), all precincts (-37.1%), and in the PSN SCAs (-44.4%). The fact that the declines were observed throughout the city means that we cannot wholly

attribute the decline to PSN but the fact that the largest decline was in the PSN SCAs is encouraging. Additionally, the fact that these declines occurred as Detroit's comprehensive strategies were able to be resumed as the impact of the pandemic lessened, and that it occurred in a period when many U.S. cities have witnessed continued increases in violent crime, speaks well of the strategies employed in Detroit.

Table 6. Shooting Victimizations, Last Two Quarters of PSN Initiative (10/1/21-3/31/22)

	Last Two Quarters Pandemic Period (10/1/20-3/31/21)	Last Two Quarters PSN Initiative (10/1/21-3/31/22)	Percent Change
PSN Precinct 9	114	88	-22.8%
All other precincts	536	397	-37.1%
PSN SCAs	63	35	-44.4%

Conclusion

The PSN initiative in the Eastern District of Michigan, focused on the 9th precinct in Detroit was affected by the COVID-19 pandemic, the subsequent impact on police personnel, the courts, and all aspects of life, as well as the period of protest and social unrest following the death of George Floyd in Minneapolis. Despite these challenges, a multi-agency team, working in collaboration with outreach workers and a variety of community partners, were able to implement a comprehensive set of enforcement, intervention, and prevention strategies. As noted above, the PSN team leveraged a variety of people-, group-, and place-based strategies with a PSN enforcement team and the development of a Crime Gun Intelligence Center and strong relationship between DPD, the U.S. Attorney's Office, and ATF to increase the potential impact of PSN. The results suggest that PSN had a positive impact on public safety as shooting victimizations were reduced in the program period prior to the period of the pandemic. The target area and the city experienced increases in shooting victimization during the period of the

pandemic, like other U.S. cities. On a positive note, during the last two quarters, the city, the 9th

precinct, and the specific PSN target areas again witnessed declines in shooting victimizations.

Appendices

Appendix A. Identifying Key PSN Partners

Criminal Justice Partners:	Involved in Planning	Involved in Implementation
Police – Detroit Police Department	X	X
Federal law enforcement – ATF; FBI; Marshals	X	X
Prosecutor's Office	X	X
U.S. Attorney Office	X	X
Community Corrections		X
Department of Correction	X	X
State Probation and/or Parole	X	X
US Probation		X
Research partner	X	X
Fiscal Agent	X	X
Local Government:		
Schools	X	X
Executive (Mayor's Office, Manager)	X	X
Public Housing		X
Community Stakeholders:		
Faith Community		X
Neighborhood Associations		X
Foundations		X
Social Services		X
Outreach Workers		X
Trauma Center		X

Appendix B. Sources of Data for Analyzing Problem

What types of data and sources of information have you gathered and analyzed?	
Calls for police service	X
Police incident reports	X
Street level intelligence	X
Systematic crime incident reviews	X
Shots fired/ShotSpotter	
National Integrated Ballistics Intelligence Network (NIBIN); Gun tracing	X
Gun crime case processing (e.g., GUNSTAT)	X
Citizen perceptions	
Community characteristics	X
Other	
What types of analysis have you conducted?	
Trend analysis	X
Crime mapping	X
Risk Terrain Modeling	X
Social Network Analysis	X
Gang audits	X
Repeat violent offender patterns	X
Other	

Appendix C. Problem Analysis Summary

Based on your analysis of violent crime patterns, to what extent are the following drivers of violent crime in your target area?		
	Rate (1=highest priority; 2=priority; 3=concern but not as significant relative to others; 4=does not appear to drive a significant amount of our violent crime)	Note if this will be a focus of your violence reduction strategy
Gangs or violent street groups	1	X
Geographic hot spot areas	1	X
Felons in possession	1	X
Prolific (chronic) violent offenders	1	X
Street disputes	1	X
Household/family/neighbor disputes	1	X
Intimate partner violence	2	X
Illegal drug markets	1	X
Other (specify): Firearms traffickers	1	X

Appendix D. Linking Targeted and Prioritized Enforcement Strategies to Problem Analysis

For each identified driver of violent crime, what strategies have you identified to address the problem?	
Insert Drivers of Violent Crime that your team has prioritized (from Appendix C)	**Strategies**
Gangs & violent street groups	Ceasefire (focused deterrence); Task Force Investigations; MDOC monitoring
Geographic hot spot areas	Directed patrol; Coordinated enforcement operations (hot people in hot places); Green Light (police business partnership, surveillance technology, RTCC); code enforcement; Targeted technology at key corridors
Felons in possession	GunStat; NIBIN
Chronic/repeat offenders	Detroit One (chronic violent offender program); Gunstat; Joint Prosecution Screening; MDOC monitoring
Street disputes	Ceasefire; Green Light
Household/family/neighbor disputes	Ceasefire
Intimate partner violence	Victim Assistance Program (VAP)
Illegal drug markets	Ceasefire; Task Force Investigations
Low clearance rates in shootings	Special One Person Grand Jury; Coordinated/layered surveillance technology; Vertical prosecution
Firearms traffickers	CGIC; NIBIN; Comprehensive firearms tracing; Multiple sales data review

Appendix E. Prevention Strategies

Identify prevention strategies that focus on high-risk people and places?	
	Strategies
People (e.g., high-risk youth; gun involved former prisoners returning to community; shooting victims; community engagement & awareness)	
People in groups/gangs/shooting networks	Ceasefire outreach intake and assessment – Adverse childhood experiences (ACES)
High-risk youth	School based prevention/mentoring (Sentry; Leadership Academy; The School Safety Initiative; The Brotherhood); CITI Camp (children in trauma intervention); Drive to Thrive; embedded social worker; Restorative Justice Training
Probationers and parolees	Risk & needs assessment (parole and probation) – Correctional offender management profiling for alternative sanctions (COMPAS); Transition accountability plan (TAP)
Victims – police community relations	Community and police response to victims of violence (CPRVV)
Places (e.g., repeat violent crime locations; repeat violent crime street segments; high violence neighborhoods, precincts, beats)	
Repeat crime locations	Project Green Light Detroit; code enforcement; blight elimination and demolition; Street engagement; Peace Walks; Safe Routes to School

Appendix F. Detroit PSN – Leveraging Strategies

	Enforcement	**Intervention**	**Prevention/ Neighborhood Development**
People-Based	Violent impact players	Focused deterrence	Shooting victim interventions; school based
Place-Based	Code enforcement	Project Green Light Detroit; Technology Corridors; Problem solving	Blight elimination/ development
Combined	Hot people in hot zones (coordinated enforcement actions)	Drug Market Intervention (under consideration)	Community engagement (building collective efficacy – participation in Ceasefire; Peace Walks)

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